Posts

My aim is to develop some aspects of a critical orientation that does not rely upon definitively human capacities, and that, as such, does not exclude atypical bodies and minds from the outset. To explore such ideas, I consider feminist theories that understand vulnerability to be a ubiquitous or even universal aspect of life, and as such, as a more appropriate basis for ethics.

I consider how certain ways of existing come to be considered as not fully human, and associated with something called ‘inhuman’; how such associations are involved in the constitution of what is taken to be fully or properly human; and finally, the deleterious effects for those who, because they move or think in unconventional ways, become associated with the inhuman.

In their arguments against repeal of the 8th Amendment of the Irish Constitution, the No campaign has used Down syndrome to suggest that this Amendment is necessary to protect disability rights. It isn’t.

I talk about very basic kinds of technology, and how these contribute to the enaction of disability. I outline two concepts: inter-mundane technology (a low level artefactuality that supports activity while falling outside awareness, so that its contribution goes unacknowledged and the activity appears natural), and technological unconscious (a corpus of habituated expectations about how the world is). I then discuss how inter-mundane technologies—which are normatively-structured—lead to one way disability gets enacted, and also arodes bodily confidence in the world.

Technologies are not mere external utilities, but are profoundly involved within human development. Explanation of such involvement takes various forms. Like natural and social artefacts, technologies have a historical development, and can acquire metaphysical baggage. One way to conceptualise technology is in terms of prosthesis: a tool—from a flint or a hammer, to language—that extends or enables capacities. I discuss prosthesis as a human-technology relation, and consider three such conceptualisations—instrumentalism, Bernard Stiegler’s originary technicity, and Gilbert Simondon’s concretisation—and consider their relevance and usefulness to disability.

I summarise some of Merleau-Ponty’s ideas, and then outline concepts from Donald Landes’ book is organised (including concepts taken from Gilbert Simondon). Then I talk about Merleau-Ponty’s The Structure of Behaviour, and Landes’ understanding of it, before offering some comments. First, I suggest that there may be a tension between Merleau-Ponty’s emphasis upon perception and Simondon’s philosophy. Second, by incorporating Simondon’s notion of being as problematic, we can develop an account of bodily behaviour that is a marked improvement on Hubert Dreyfus’s interpretation of Merleau-Ponty, which over-emphasises the achievement of smooth equilibriums.

This paper concerns concepts that inform medical and social theories of impairment. It discusses impairment in relation to normal function, including its identification as deviation from normal health. It then draws upon phenomenological concepts to develop an alternate account of embodiment, as always already dependent upon relations with things outside itself. It posits that ’normal ability’ is consequently a socio-historical elaboration rather than an objectively existing state of affairs, and that the accompanying prioritisation of some modes of embodiment over others creates the phenomenon called disability. Finally, it outlines an alternative framework that eschews reference to transcendent norms for grounding in capacities and goals, however atypical, of embodied agents.